Introduction
The objective of this study is to review past research on people's sense of trust as reflected in the data from longitudinal and cross-national comparative surveys by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics. This includes the Japanese National Character Survey, the Seven Country Survey (Japan, USA, and five European countries) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) , Japanese immigrant surveys, the East Asia Values Survey (EAVS) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) , the Pacific-Rim Values Survey (PRVS) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) , and the Asia-Pacific Values Survey (APVS) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) . Among other issues, I focus on trust systems to explore what aspects of sense of trust are stable and what aspects are variable longitudinally in accordance with economic or political conditions. This may eventually lead us to explore more universal social values beyond differences in countries and time in the study of the stability of peoples' basic social values as reflected in data from our past surveys on national character over the past six decades. The background and the significance of this study are as follows.
The last three decades has witnessed a rapid global change that has led to the destruction of the traditional world order and to chaos before the construction of a new order. Japan struggled with recession in a period called the "lost decade," which eventually lasted much longer and became known as the "lost two decades." At the faceted methodological problems. First, it is a difficult task scientifically to compare responses collected under different conditions, e.g., different languages and different statistical sampling methods. There is no a priori knowledge regarding how these varying conditions influence peoples' responses even in cases where there is no substantive difference between the peoples. Thus, an important problem for our study is the need to investigate those conditions under which meaningful cross-national comparability of social survey data is guaranteed. This problem involves many analytical and methodological sub-problems, including 1) translation (i e., the same questionnaire items must be written in different languages), 2) comparison of data sets collected by different sampling procedures used in different countries, 3) characterization of the nations (i.e., in which respects and to what degree certain nations are similar or dissimilar to others), and 4) the description of nations in terms of common logic rather than logic particular to a certain nation. These sub-problems are complementary in the sense that solutions to these problems are related to each other. Some findings have been reported in our past publications (C. Hayashi, 1993 Hayashi, , 2001a Hayashi, , 2001b C. Hayashi, et al., 1998; C. Hayashi & Yoshino, 2002; F. Hayashi & Yamaoka, 2002; Kuroda, 2002; Matsumoto, 2006; Yoshino, 2000 Yoshino, , 20001a, 2001c Yoshino, , 2003 Yoshino, , 2005a Yoshino, , 2005b Yoshino, , 2009 Yoshino, , 2012 Yoshino, , 2013 Yoshino, , 2014d Yoshino, F. Hayashi & Yamaoka, 2010) .
We have taken several steps forward toward a scientific foundation for crossnational comparison with our established methodologies called Cultural Linkage Analysis (CLA) and Cultural Manifold Analysis (CULMAN) (see Yoshino et al., 2015 , of this issue) for the mutual understanding of peoples all over the world; prediction of the mass behavior of a certain nation in response to a particular event; prediction of the political determination of a particular nation in international relations; scientific understanding of the rise and fall of civilizations; and investigation of an ideal condition in Japan and the world for the development and maintenance of world peace.
The composition of the remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives a minimum review of past studies on sense of trust. In Section 3, I summarize some aspects of fundamental social values of the Japanese and their sense of interpersonal trust as identified in our Japanese National Character Survey. In Section 4, I present a cross-national comparative analysis of interpersonal trust, institutional trust, and some social values as explored through our past surveys. Finally, Section 5 presents some suggestions for future research.
Reconstruction of Trust during the Transitional Period
The transition after the end of the Cold War brought domestic and international confusion in various areas worldwide as well as in various domains of daily life. In addition, there has been a rapid transition from the established social system based on traditional industry to a system founded on highly advanced information technology in the last quarter-century or so. The global rise of new social and political movements has also brought confusion into daily life. As a result, we have faced the collapse of our sense of trust in the traditional world order and in the traditional sys-tems of education, ethics, family, law, marriage, the work environment, etc. This does not necessarily mean, however, that each individual has totally lost his or her interpersonal trust. It may be that people's sense of trust and energy are wandering and need to be directed toward the development of a new interpersonal system. Thus, it is important to investigate how people's attitudes toward the traditional trust system will change in the near future. Under these conditions, "trust" has been extensively studied over the past quarter-century (e.g., Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1995) .
Although there are various possible definitions of "trust," all of them may be roughly classified as "trust in transactions" or "trust in normative philosophy," as summarized in Hosmer (1995) . The study of trust in normative philosophy has a long history, at least since Aristotle in the West and Buddha and Confucius in the East, but it is rare these days. Uslaner's (2002 Uslaner's ( , 2010 studies present an exception. In addition, the study of trust in transactions has been the focus of many papers published during the recent years of globalization. Zucker (1986) pointed out three methods for the production of trust: 1) processbased trust tied to past exchanges; 2) characteristic-based trust tied to personal characteristics, such as family background and ethnicity; and 3) institution-based trust tied to formal societal structures. Shapiro (1987) criticized the third category because he believes that trust cannot be institutionalized. Further, Zucker (1986) claimed that trust is not directly measurable. This may have influenced Fukuyama's (1995) methodology, as he used various datasets concerning "distrust," such as the crime, divorce, and unemployment rates, rather than a direct measure of trust through public opinion surveys. My focus in this study is mainly on the second of Zucker's three categories of trust, i.e., trust based on personal characteristics, although the three categories are mutually interrelated. Banfield (1958) regarded "distrust" as the culture of the poor. This motivated Yoshino (2002) to investigate the relationships between people's sense of trust and their economic conditions. His data showed some cross-national differences in the degree of correlation between people's sense of trust and their household income or subjective social class: Americans' sense of trust may be closely related to their economic conditions, whereas the Japanese sense of trust seems stable regardless of their economic condition, although the collapse of the life-long employment system and almost two decades of economic depression might make the Japanese sense of trust more sensitive to economic conditions. Derived from G. H. Mead's approach, Miyamoto, Fugita, and Kashima (2002) developed a theory of interpersonal relations based on balancing direct behavior and deep cognition to facilitate an understanding of the differences in character between Japanese and Americans. They indicated, for example, that the Japanese prefer delayed action and pay more attention to the perceptions of others, of themselves, and of the situation, whereas Americans favor direct action and pay more attention to their own views. Their theory was originally developed for the study of Americans with Japanese ancestry (or Japanese immigrants in general) and their transition of generations from first ("Issei") to second generation ("Nisei"), and then from second to third generation ("Sansei"), and so on. This theory may lead to an understanding of the interaction between racial origins and social environments (see .
As for measurements of national character, Inkeles (1997) claimed that aspects directly related to economic or political conditions should not be regarded as part of the "national character." It is reasonable, however, to assume that people of different countries may respond differently to certain economic or political items on a questionnaire even under the same economic and political conditions, and that such differences in response patterns may be closely related to "national character." For example, in the late 1980s, Brazilians showed a high degree of life satisfaction and happiness even when their country was experiencing severe conditions regarding international debt. In contrast, the Japanese did not show a high degree of life satisfaction and happiness even when their economy was close to being the best-performing one in the world. To understand phenomena like these, we need to identify general tendencies in different peoples' manners of responding; therefore, both objective and subjective means of measurement must be complementarily employed.
Among various efforts to relate trust with social issues in the last two decades, public health may be one of the most productive fields in the study of social capital (voluntary activity or interpersonal trust). For example, Kawachi et al. (1997) reported that a greater degree of social capital was closely linked to better health as measured by medical research experiments and social surveys at the individual and state levels in the USA. Their findings have been confirmed in some countries but not in others. In Japan, no clear relationship had been confirmed, probably because one difficulty is identifying what spatial unit (prefecture, city, village, etc.) should be adopted in attempts to relate health to social capital (sense of trust).
As for the ranking of the interpersonal trust scale of the GSS (see Sec. 3.2), Yoshino and Tsunoda (2010) showed that the Japanese are in the middle and the Italians and the French are in the lower echelons, respectively, but that they all rank higher in life expectancy than countries that rank higher on interpersonal trust, such as the USA and the UK. This suggests that the positive response rates of interpersonal trust and peoples' health (life expectancy) are not related to each other simply but are intertwined. Thus, we may need to question the universal validity of the GSS items as a scale of trust in the cross-national comparative context, or it may be necessary to consider the possibility of a non-linear correlation between health and social capital (cf. Yoshino, 2002, Fig. 4) .
Incidentally, we need to think about the general response tendency of each ethnic group, nation, or race, such as the Japanese preference for the middle categories, the French preference for expressing critical attitudes, and the Indian tendency to choose positive categories. It is important to note regarding the possibilities that these tendencies are closely related to several factors associated with differences in communication between multiracial countries and mono-racial countries or with degrees of the development of democracy (see Yoshino, 2009, Table 2 ; Yoshino & Osaki, 2013) .
A logistic regression analysis by Tsunoda, Yoshino, and Yokoyama (2008) revealed certain relationships between two dependent variables on self-rated health and health dissatisfaction and some independent variables such as religion, social capital, spirituality, superstitions, etc., as part of a national character study. For example, in males with negative attitudes on generalized interpersonal trust (Q38 of Sec. 3), the number of self-reported symptoms was greater; in females, negative attitudes on norms of reciprocity (Q36 of Sec. 3) were associated with a greater number of self-reported symptoms. In both genders, self-reported symptoms and health dissatisfaction were greater in the presence of anxiety. A larger number of self-reported symptoms were associated with adherence to religion and spirituality in males. In females, the degree of health dissatisfaction was greater in those with low income and concern about superstitions. Thus, perceived health is susceptible to the influence of personal relationships in females and to distrust in males. In addition, females were influenced by economic status and superstitions, whereas males were more concerned about religion or the mind in relation to health. This study is consistent with Maselko and Kubzansky's (2006) inference that men who begin to feel psychological distress stop going to religious services, whereas women who begin to feel bad continue to attend. Inaba started his study on trust originally as an economist, but now he and his colleagues have published many books on social capital as a broad interdisciplinary research topic (Inaba [ed.] Overall, it is worthwhile to emphasize the importance of a complementary approach using objective and subjective measures for the scientific scaling of trust in questionnaire surveys (Yoshino, Sec. 2.1 of Inaba et al., 2014; Yoshino, 2014a) .
Interpersonal Trust and Social Values
In this section, I consider certain aspects of "trust" reflected in responses to our Japanese National Character survey. I also pay attention to the survey data on the variability of people's trust systems to explore which aspects of people's sense of trust are stable over many decades and which vary with changes, e.g., in economic and political conditions. As mentioned previously, some researchers say that "trust" is not directly measurable. There may be no universal scale on sense of trust beyond differences in cultures and time, and, even if there is such a scale, it may not be linear with respect to various factors (e.g., the non-linear effect of income or social class on sense of trust, as shown in Sec. 2). However, I believe that people's responses in questionnaire surveys can reveal certain aspects of their sense of trust if the time series patterns or cross-national patterns of those responses are adequately analyzed and general response tendencies of nations and personality types are adequately considered.
Our longitudinal survey shows some stable aspects of the attitudes and social values of the Japanese (Hayashi & Kuroda, 1997; Yoshino, 1994) . I briefly explain certain fundamental dimensions of Japanese social values in Sec. 3.1 and some analyses of the sense of trust among Japanese along several dimensions with some remarks on scaling in Sec. 3.2.
Fundamental Dimensions of Japanese Social Values
Hayashi (1993) identified two important dimensions that underlie the Japanese national character: 1) the dimension of interpersonal relationships (a Giri-Ninjyo attitude, or a sort of emotional conflict between the obligation to uphold social duties and warm-heartedness) and 2) the dimension of contrast between the modern and traditional in their way of thinking.
On one hand, basic Japanese interpersonal attitudes have been stable, at least over the last half-century and probably much longer. (Most likely, the basic aspects of interpersonal attitudes may be stable in any country over time. However, certain aspects that are sensitive to changes in economic or political conditions may vary in the short term in most countries.)
On the other hand, Japan had strived since the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to overtake Western science and technology and develop it into a Japanese adaptation. It is likely that this enduring effort had underlined the dimension of the traditional versus modern orientation in the Japanese way of thinking, probably until the early 1970s or so.
However, the Japanese way of thinking has been changing gradually. Our survey of 1978 identified a generation gap between people aged 20-24 years old and those aged 25 years or older (Footnote 1). Since signs of generational changes appeared as early as 1978, the Japanese way of thinking had become more complicated than ever. Furthermore, the Japanese have been living in a period of transition from the established social system to a system of a highly advanced information age in the last two decades or so. This has brought disruption not only to the fields of science and technology but also to the fields of economics and politics. In this period of confusion, the majority of Japanese people have come to distrust traditional systems such as banking and bureaucracy as well as the legislature, police, etc. (Yoshino, 2002) . This must be closely related to the recent changes in governing parties. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) governed Japan some four decades alone and then in a coalition with other parties from 1993 until 2009. This might symbolize the Japanese political attitude that dislikes rapid changes. Under globalization, however, Japan came under pressure to restructure its social systems, including business, education, and law in the last quarter-century. This necessitated change in even the most fundamental human relationships, not only in business but also in daily life, eventually 1) Note that the younger generation was born more than 10 years after the end of World War II.
In 1956, an economic white paper declared, "Japan is no longer in the post-war condition," and this symbolized the start of the high-speed development of industry and economy. However, Japan had to face pollution problems as a result of the high-speed industrialization around 1970. sapping the source of national power. Confusion appeared with the switching of the governing party from the LDP to the Democratic Party in 2009 and then back to the LDP in 2012. The current Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, forced to resign in 2007 but revived politically in December 2012, is struggling to revive Japanese national power. In people's attitudes, values, or ways of thinking, some fundamental interpersonal relationships must be stable to maintain the social order.
Sense of Interpersonal Trust of the Japanese
Psychological studies of measures of interpersonal trust have been developed in recent decades (Rosenberg, 1956; Rotter, 1971) . Many of these studies may have some methodological limitations because they are based on sample sizes that are too small or not based on statistically random samples. The significance of such studies, however, may have been justified by a statement made by Rotter (1971, p. 443 ) during the Cold War: "It seems clear that disarmament will not proceed without an increase in trust on one or both sides of the iron curtain." The iron curtain was torn down more than a quarter-century ago, but new local conflicts have been occurring incessantly all over the world. This necessitates the continued study of interpersonal and international trust, and the study of the production of trust necessitates the measurement of trust.
A set of three items from the GSS has been used to measure people's sense of trust (see Yoshino & Osaki, 2013 , for some history of those items). Although the GSS started as a sort of American version of our Japanese National Character Survey, we adopted the three items from their questionnaire for our survey in 1978. They are stated as follows (for the Japanese questionnaire, see Sakamoto et al., 2000, or http://www.ism.ac.jp/kokuminsei/index. html; see also footnote 2).
Q36. Would you say that, most of the time, people try to be helpful, or that they are mostly just looking out for themselves?
1. Try to be helpful, 2. Look out for themselves Q37. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?
1. Take advantage, 2. Try to be fair, 2) Throughout this paper, codes such as Q36 correspond to the common item code of the APVS questionnaire. In most cases, I leave the exact wording of items and the precise data on response rates to the series of ISM Survey Research Reports (http://www.ism.ac.jp/editsec/kenripo/contents e.html) or the website for ISM surveys (http://www.ism.ac.jp/ism info e/kokuminsei e. html). As for Q38, there are slight differences in wording between our cross-national Japan survey and the Japanese National Character Survey. In the process of a translation and back-translation check to make a cross-national version of the Japan survey questionnaire, we obtained these two versions. We have confirmed that this difference may produce some percentage differences in the response distributions, but the overall pattern is stable.
Q38. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?
1. Can be trusted, 2. Can't be too careful,
Here I discuss the dimensionality and wording of these items. Almond and Verba (1963) used factor analysis on a set of student survey data to select several items among hundreds of items on trust, and the aforementioned three items survived to be included in the GSS and other related surveys. Thus, the three items were supposed to measure different dimensions of trust: Q36 is related to a sort of trust in neighbors (or the norm of reciprocity), Q38 is related to general interpersonal trust, and Q37 is concerned with something in between the other two items. Our data, however, have repeatedly demonstrated that, among these items, Q37 and Q38 are more correlated for the Japanese, whereas Q36 and Q37 are more correlated for Americans. Thus, two of the three items (Q36 and Q37, or Q37 and Q38) may capture fairly independent aspects, but all three do not necessarily capture such factors. Therefore, I sometimes use the independent items Q36 and Q38 when I must reduce the number of items in a questionnaire. Tables 1a, 1b, 1c, and 1d give a more recent summary of the data to see the structures of the three pairs of correlations between the three items. Each country of our APVS corresponds to either the pattern of Japan or that of the USA; therefore, the independence of dimensionality of these two items always held, with the exception of the India 2008 and 2013 surveys, which showed a higher correlation between Q36 and Q38 (Yoshino & Osaki, 2013 , Yoshino, 2014c . Some countries show more or less stable patterns over years, whereas some other countries, such as South Korea, show some variability. At this point in the research, I am not sure whether South Korea's variability is caused by some essential changes, a slight change in survey item wordings, or changes in survey conditions. Concerning Q38, some people may suspect that the second response option, "can't be too careful," is not likely to mean distrust but to refer to another positive social value related to self-discipline. This may explain the higher rates of selection for this answer than the first option, "can be trusted," in many countries (see Table 2 of Yoshino, 2002) .
NORC-ROPER (1986) reported comparative survey data with respect to the effect of the second option. In the survey, two cases were compared: in Case 1, the same wording as Q38 was used, and in Case 2, the phrase "can't be trusted" was used. The second answer was less frequently chosen in Case 2 than in Case 1 (i.e., more people answered "can be trusted"). The same pattern of response change was found in Japanese surveys (compare Sakamoto et al. [2000] with Osaka Shogyo University & Tokyo University [1999] ). Thus, the wording of Q38 may be considered a sort of advanced technique to elicit people's true opinion (honne in Japanese), reducing the degree of social desirability in responses (tatemae in Japanese).
I frequently use the percentage of those who selected positive responses to all three items ("1" for Q36, "2" for Q37, and "1" for Q38) as a trust scale, although other definitions of a trust scale may be possible based on these three items. The response is shown in Fig. 1 . These figures show that the Japanese people's sense of trust has been fairly stable on this scale from 1983 (Yoshino [2014d included incorrect data for 1978 but corrected them in Fig.1) , however, the Japanese data also show some changes over the years, although the degree of change may be smaller than that of the USA. The changes may be related to the economic change after the oil shock and the Nixon shock around 1973 and the disaster of the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, respectively. Yoshino (2009) noted the remarkably low degree of trust among those age 60-64 years in the 1998 survey. These people were children during WWII and experienced a drastic social change from a military regime to a postwar democracy. They had a hard time surviving the time of famine that occurred during and immediately after the war, and they reconstructed the ruins of Japan to build a highly advanced industrialized country. Under the economic depression, called "the lost decade," of the 1990s, most people of this generation had retired from the lifelong employment system, but they did not receive as much pension money as they had expected, and many had a hard time finding new jobs. The aforementioned data may reflect their distrust toward the social systems that did not compensate them sufficiently for their lifelong hard work. Incidentally, this generation forms a particular cohort whose opinions and values are different from those of the other generations in many cases (see Mizuno et al., 1992) .
In analyzing data from a more recent survey conducted in 2010, I found that, roughly, the cross-tabulation of Q36, Q37, and Q38 with respect to gender, age, and education does not seem to show any remarkable differences in response patterns. An assessment of the response distributions of the cross-tabulations more precisely, however, reveals some differences. As for gender, women are more optimistic than men on Q37, but both men and women show the same response patterns on Q36 and Q38. As for education level by gender on Q37, generally, women are more positive than men, disregarding their education levels; furthermore, men with higher education show a higher rate of distrust than men with lower education on Q37. No such trend was observed for women. On Q38, the higher level of education shows the higher level of trust for both genders. In the cross-tabulation of gender by age, more women under 35 years of age tended to choose "can't be too careful" for Q38 than the other age groups.
Although the Japanese sense of trust may have been more stable with respect to economic changes than that of Americans, the economic structural reformation of the last two decades seemed to have damaged the Japanese sense of trust to some extent, as Fig. 1 may suggest. In the early 1990s, the educational system was changed significantly from a system that imposed hard work on pupils to a system that gives them more free time, called yutori-kyoiku ("relaxed education"), despite other countries trying to imitate the hard-work education to catch up to the then-high economic level of Japan. The new system was expected to produce creative youth with diverse attitudes and social values, but it simply produced many self-centered persons lacking basic skills in various fields. In the early 1990s, economic conditions were still fairly good. These young people enjoyed the ability to move easily from one workplace to another, outside the system of traditional life-long employment, trying to find the best place for themselves, as if looking for "the Blue Bird." However, the system of employment has changed from one of life-long employment to one in which workers, including those in public sector jobs, can easily be fired. This has produced distrust between employers and employees: workers are afraid of losing their jobs, whereas employers are afraid of losing workers soon after they have invested heavily in their training.
Meanwhile, the government has lost people's trust in the national pension system. Senior people rely on younger people for future financial support, but the population of younger generations has been decreasing, and they are less motivated to pay pension costs, in consideration of the balance between their total payments and their expected return in the future. These situations have necessarily led to a loss of trust between the young and senior people.
Thus, the difference in trust found in Japanese and American samples may largely come from the difference between the employment systems: workers' salaries may be lower, but workers could not be fired so easily in the life-long employment system of Japan, at least until recently. This reminds us of the Chinese proverb of Mengzi: "No stable mind without a stable job." All those social reforms have been made under globalization. Without consideration of the culture of each country, it simply leads to confusion.
Regarding the relationship between crime rates and the sense of interpersonal trust (Q38) from 1983 , Inaba (2002 , Fig.1-12 ) showed a causal relationship between the economy and trust in Japan: the economic change from prosperity to recession gradually led to an increase in crime and eventually to an increase in people's sense of distrust with a time lag of some five years. Yoshino (2002) discussed several other aspects of trust, such as trust in politics, science, and technology as well as the work ethic of the Japanese, and concluded that some aspects of trust might be variable according to economic and political conditions, whereas other aspects may be more stable over time. Generally, the Japanese show stability in interpersonal trust, whereas their attitudes toward work and their work Roughly, the trends of these two lines coincide with each other, but the rate of valid returned questionnaires may be closely associated with the attitude of cooperation of the respondents in the survey. Therefore, it might be necessary to discount the percentage of trust to estimate the statistics for the general population.
ethic seem to have been influenced by economic and political conditions, although the Japanese used to have the stereotype of being too-diligent workers called the "economic animal" in the 1980s. (See Inagaki and Maeda [in press ] for the study of trust using latent structure modelling on the Japanese National Character Survey.) For more careful analysis, we need to consider the effect of longitudinal changes in the rate of valid returned questionnaires on the superficial response percentage for a certain item. A longitudinal survey on the happiness of high school students conducted by the NHK Broadcasting Culture Research Institute (2013) reported that the number of "happy" high school students had been rapidly increasing over three decades in Japan and that more than 90 percent of the students were "happy" in the 2010 survey. This was a surprise because it appeared to contradict the real situations of current Japanese high school students. Yoshino (2014b) showed, however, that the multiplication of the percentage of happy students and the rate of valid returned questionnaires for each survey turns out to be fairly stable over the three decades. This suggests that participation in the survey and the response of happiness may be highly correlated (i.e., many "unhappy" students may have been excluded from the surveys).
Concerning our Japanese National Character Survey, Fig.2 shows that the changes in the valid questionnaire return rate may not have a remarkable effect on the trend of responses regarding interpersonal generalized trust. However, Yoshino (2014b) showed a constant decrease of the aforementioned multiplication in the Japan surveys of 2002 (EAVS), 2004 (PRVS), 2010 (APVS), and 2013 (the 13 th survey of Japanese national character). Simply because we cannot estimate the precise distribution of missing data, we need more studies to determine whether it really reflects a decrease in interpersonal trust in Japan or not (cf. Fushiki & Maeda, 2013; Tsuchiya, 2010) . Also, we must pay attention to general response tendencies that are closely related to degrees of self-disclosure (Yoshino, Hayashi & Yamaoka, 2010) and the optimistic vs. pessimistic personalities of individuals and nations. Yoshino (2014a) reviewed past studies on happiness, life satisfaction, and well-being and concluded that "happiness" shown in survey data is closely related to the personality of each individual as well as each nation. More explicitly, the long-term tendency is relatively stable over time regardless of objective economic or political conditions (Hofstead, Hofstead & Minkov, 2010) , whereas it significantly changes in the short term, such as in a day (Kahneman & Krueger, 2006) . A similar tendency may be seen in our study on sense of trust. Thus, although it does not exclude the importance of the measurement of detailed change in sense of trust, we may need to be careful regarding the distinction between the long-term tendency and the short-term tendency of peoples' sense of trust in cross-national comparison.
Cross-National Comparison of Interpersonal and Institutional Trust and More Universal Social Values
In this section, I present an overview of people's sense of trust as shown in our past cross-national surveys. I deal with the sense of interpersonal trust in Sec. 4.1, institutional trust in Sec. 4.2, and Japanese immigrant surveys in Sec. 4.3. In Sec. 4.4, I show some data on the fundamental social values, exploring more universal values that may underlie people's sense of trust.
Sense of Interpersonal Trust
Our cross-national surveys also included the three items on interpersonal trust from the GSS mentioned in the previous section. Tables 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, 2e, 2f, and 2g show the response distributions of the GSS trust scale for most of the countries/areas that we have surveyed over the past four decades.
Miyake presented an analysis of this topic (Hayashi et al., 1998 , Ch. 7) as a member of our Seven Country Survey: Japan, the USA, the UK, West Germany, and France in 1987 -1988 and Italy and the Netherlands in 1992 . He concluded that the trust scale had low correlations with gender and religion but stronger correlations with family income, educational level, and social class. These correlations were not strong.
On this scale, West Germany, the UK, and the USA scored higher than Japan and the Netherlands, but the difference was small. The French and Italians clearly scored lower than those in other nations. In addition, Miyake found that those who had religious faith gave more positive responses to item Q36, irrespective of their religious affiliation. Furthermore, he found a gender difference in responses to item Q37. Specifically, women gave more optimistic answers than men, i.e., "they would try to be fair." As for item Q38, there was a clear difference between social classes in all seven countries: the higher the social class, the more trustful the respondents were. The difference between classes was remarkably large in France and the USA. Miyake also observed that a higher level of education was associated with greater trust, and he suspected that the association was caused by the correlation between education and social class. (Although there was a relatively strong correlation between education and social class or between education and income in the USA, this is not necessarily the case for all other countries.) Using the same data, Yoshino (2002) showed almost linear correlations between trust and (self-reported) social class or income in the USA and the UK but non-linear correlations in the other five countries, including Japan and West Germany. Fig. 3 shows the percentage in each country of those who gave positive answers to both Q36 and Q38. I frequently use these two items because Q37 was not used in some of our past surveys, and I have confirmed that the general pattern for that figure was almost the same as for a figure made using all three items for the countries or areas where all three items were asked. Examples are the surveys in Japan in 1988 , 2004 and those in Beijing and Shanghai in 2002 , 2005 , and 2011 . More precisely, however, we must be careful about the correlations of the two or three GSS items, as mentioned in Sec. 3. We may also need to pay attention to the rapid change in the percentages of Australia from 2007 to 2012 shown in Fig.3 . At this point in the research, it is unclear whether it is an essential change or one caused by some problem involving the survey conditions. Overall, this index seems useful, at least for obtaining an overview of the general pattern of many countries/areas.
The percentages of positive responses in the USA and the UK were high, whereas those in Italy and France were low. This result may be consistent with Fukuyama's (1995) comparative economics theory to contrast Japan, the USA, and Germany as highly trustful countries, with China and Italy as less trustful countries. A close look at this figure, however, shows a more complicated reality because the percentages of positive responses in surveys from Mainland China (Beijing and Shanghai) were higher than might have been expected. As for the data of China, there may be several possible explanations. First, the data really do indicate that the Chinese might have a higher sense of interpersonal trust. Second, the Chinese might have tried to show a higher sense of interpersonal trust because they were sensitive to their international reputation, such as that observed by Fukuyama. Third, the questionnaire items were constructed as a trust scale for Americans, so they may not be suitable for the measurement of trust in other nations. Fourth, we must be careful about the semantics of the trust scale. For example, Dogan (2000, p. 258) states, "Erosion of confidence is first of all a sign of political maturity. It is not so much that democracy has deteriorated, but rather the critical spirit of most citizens has improved." This suggests that we must always be sensitive to the distinction between the face value of a scale and its semantics. In this context, trust and distrust may not be opposites on a uni-dimensional scale but may instead be closely related in one's mind in a sort of multidimensional structure. Furthermore, people may have given the same response for different reasons or different responses for the same reason. Therefore, for a more meaningful comparison of countries, it is necessary to consider peoples' responses with more objective measures on, e.g., economics and politics, as well as general response tendencies of those people. In this study, I may give some interpretations of the response patterns on certain items, but they should necessarily be considered tentative. To reduce the effects of general response tendencies particular to individuals or countries, Yoshino (2005b) transformed the response data from the EAVS into standardized scores country by country. Here, let us use a much easier way to reduce the general response tendencies in countries (Yoshino, 2009 ). First, the original response categories are re-categorized to sum up the percentage of responses to positive categories ("1" and "2"). Second, the percentages of positive responses are compared item by item in each country. This yields a rank order of items in each country. Third, the rank orders of all countries involved are compared. This procedure results in the loss of some information from the original data, but it provides more cross-national comparability. This is a trade-off that we have to make to secure cross-national comparability beyond a simple comparison of the face values of the original data.
Trust of Social Institutions and Systems
Tables 3a, 3b and 3c show generally consistent patterns in the countries or areas participating in all three surveys (cf. Yoshino, 2005b) , although the response distributions may not be totally unchanged over time. For example, the item-by-item differences of percentages between the Japan surveys in 2002 (EAVS), 2004 (PRVS), and 2010 (APVS) were almost within the margin of the sampling error. The maximum difference was about 10%, for example, on NPO/NGO. Roughly, the stability of the data was confirmed. (The percentage on NPO/NGO changed from 55% in 2002 to 45% in 2004 and then up to 49% in 2010. It might be a result of the fact that NPO/NGO activities had been increasing and some disguised NPO/NGOs had managed illegal businesses in the early 2000s, which was one of the reasons that the Japanese laws on registered organizations were substantially revised in 2008.)
Except for India, Singapore, Vietnam, the USA and Hong Kong, in all the studied countries or areas, there was a low degree of confidence in religious organizations. Even in these five countries or areas, the relative degrees of confidence were not very high compared with all the other items for each country, except for India. Japan and Mainland China indicated remarkably negative attitudes toward religious organizations. The percentage of positive responses among Japanese was lower than among Chinese. However, of the 10 items on Q50, the percentage of positive responses was the lowest for religious organization among Chinese. It is known that most Japanese respect religions or the "religious heart/mind" even when they do not have religious faith (Hayashi & Nikaido, 2009 ). However, they may be cautious about "religious organizations" because some religious groups, such as Aum Shinrikyo (Aum religious cult) caused serious problems in the 1990s. In China, the government has been very sensitive toward religious groups because, in the long history of China, religious groups have frequently overthrown governments. In some countries, some religious groups are closely linked to terrorism.
The percentages of responses that show confidence in authority such as the "police," "government," and "Congress" may represent various patterns of attitudes; these are likely concerned with democracy. A negative attitude does not necessarily mean the negation of such authority, and it may reflect a mature democracy in some countries (Dogan, 2000, p. 258) . The percentage of positive (or negative) responses, however, may not be proportional to the degree of political maturity. Tables 3a, 3b and 3c show, for example, the USA's lower degrees of confidence in the press and TV and in Congress. This may be a critical attitude of matured democracy, or it may be a reflection of current confusions of democracy.
As for the item on trust in science and technology, all the countries or areas showed a high degree of confidence. Hayashi (1993) and Zheng and Yoshino (2003) presented cross-national analyses of data on science and technology from our seven-country survey. Hayashi (1993) concluded that the Japanese generally had positive attitudes toward science. However, they were negative regarding scientific approaches toward the understanding of the human heart and mind (kokoro in Japanese), solving social and economic problems, and the possibility of living in space stations in the near future (at the time of the survey in 1988). The response pattern of West Germans in 1987 was similar to that of Japanese in the sense that they were also more negative about science and technology than those in other Western countries. However, they were not so negative toward the contributions of science and technology to social problems as well as psychological problems of individuals, as the Japanese were. This might remind us that the theories of Hegel and Marx and the scientific psychological theories of Freud originated in Germany and Austria.
As for data from the APVS, all of the countries or areas were highly positive toward science and technology, with rates of positivity for that item being the highest among all items. In particular, the rates for Mainland China were remarkably close to 100% in both the PRVS and EAVS, although the rates were slightly down in the APVS. There may be several possible explanations for this. On the one hand, the high rates may represent the fact that, since the late 1970s, China has been emphasizing the scientific reformation of government agencies, military systems, and social systems as a priority in their social planning. On the other hand, until recently, they had not paid much attention to the negative impact of science and technology that advanced industrial countries have experienced in the past. This is probably because they placed priority on economic development in the past two decades or so. This may explain the overly positive attitudes. After the Beijing Olympics in 2008 or even slightly earlier, the Chinese government started paying attention to the negative side of rapid economic and industrial development and began planning to improve environ-mental conditions, including serious air, soil and water pollution. Incidentally, they are also paying attention to political issues, such as the social gaps between urban and rural areas. They are struggling to deal with these domestic problems, but complete solutions seem very far away to many observers' eyes (Reuters, 2013 , despite their rising power in international relationships.
As a final comment in this section, it should be noted that Sasaki and Suzuki (2000, Ch.11) concluded that "a single scale is not adequate to measure people's sense of trust in science and technology because people's attitudes differ from one issue to another within the fields of science and technology." This is probably also the case with our study on people's sense of trust in general.
Sense of Trust among Japanese Immigrants and Ethnic Differences within a Single Country
In this section, I summarize regional and generational differences of Japanese immigrants in Hawaii (Yoshino, 2001b) , Brazil (Yamamoto et al., 1993) , and the U.S. West Coast (Yoshino, 2000 (Yoshino, , 2001a , as well as ethnic differences (the Chinese, Malays, and Indians) in Singapore and between Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders in Taiwan.
Our past surveys have already clarified similarities and dissimilarities between Japanese living in Japan and Japanese immigrants abroad. First, regarding the Japanese tendency to avoid polar categories and to prefer intermediate response categories in a questionnaire survey (Hayashi & Kuroda, 1997; Hayashi et al., 1998, p. 388) , there are some variations even in the USA. This may be a result of the situational differences between the place where they need to make their intentions clear to communicate successfully in their host countries (e.g., the mainland USA) and the place where the Japanese comprise the largest group among the minorities (e.g., Hawaii).
Second, we found that the Japanese style of interpersonal attitudes (Giri-Ninjyo attitudes) or religious attitudes (they think that a religious heart/mind is important, regardless of whether they themselves have religious faith or not) was preserved among the immigrant first and second generations in the USA. The third and younger generations seem to have become more adapted to the country where they were born and now live (Hayashi, 1993; Yamaoka, 2000, Fig. 4, Table 3; Yoshino, 2000, p. 197; 2001b, p. 52; .
Third, Brazilian Japanese (Yamamoto et al., 1993, p. 435) showed a much lower degree of sense of trust for each of the three items (Q36, Q37, and Q38) than most responders in the other countries (Table 2g) . Furthermore, an even lower degree of trust was found in the third or younger generation than in the first and second generations (see footnote 3). As a whole, the pattern of sense of trust in Brazil appeared close to those of France (1987 survey) and Italy (1992 survey). As for the immigrants in Hawaii and on the West Coast (Table 2g) , they showed a higher degree of trust than most responders in the other countries, including Japan and the USA. (Unfortunately, the survey of the U. S. West Coast Japanese immigrants did not include Q37.) For an understanding of the generations of Japanese immigrants in the USA, there is a frame of comparison, as Kitano (1993, Ch.13) showed. Namely, the first generation was called "Japs" and was discriminated against as immigrants from Japan. The second generation represents Japanese Americans who have been constantly in search of their own identity between the USA and Japan (many of them voluntarily fought in WWII as American soldiers, while their parents were placed in concentration camps by the American government). The third generation or younger are simply Americans of Japanese descent. Yoshino (2002, Fig. 8) showed no significant difference between Japanese Americans and non-Japanese Americans among Honolulu residents with regard to trust (Q36, Q37, and Q38). (In Hawaii, no ethnic group was the majority, and Japanese Americans comprise the largest group among the minorities, except whites.) Furthermore, Yoshino (2002, Fig. 9 ) provided details of the cross-ethnic comparison among Hawaii residents, although we need to be careful regarding the conclusion because the samples for each were too small.
Time series data from the Hawaii Resident Survey showed longitudinal changes among Japanese residents of Hawaii in terms of trust for each generation (Yoshino, 2002, Fig. 10 ). There was no large difference between generations over the two decades, except for some differences between second and third generations in 1988. This might be explained by the complicated mixture of ethnicities in Hawaii. In addition, there was little change in the sense of interpersonal trust in each generation over those two decades.
As for Japanese Americans on the West Coast, the survey questionnaire included only two items on trust (Q36 and Q38). Data for the West Coast showed a large difference between generations: the older generation seemed the more trustful (Yoshino, 2002, Fig. 11 ), although this was not seen in the Hawaii data. We should be very careful when interpreting the data because there may be several compounding factors (such as age, generation, physical condition, economic conditions, and residential area). The difference between Japanese Americans in Hawaii and Japanese Americans on the West Coast with regard to generational differences may be related to differences in their concepts of ethnicity. That is, Japanese Americans on the mainland would have no problem classifying themselves as Americans of Japanese descent. Conversely, many Hawaiian residents are of highly mixed ethnicity in this multi-ethnic society, so people's perception of ethnicity depends upon how they identify themselves in the ethnic classification -this ought to be no different for the Japanese Hawaiians. In addition, the different conditions of Japanese Americans in Hawaii and on the West Coast during WWII may have had an effect on their attitudes and social values (see footnote 4). Next, see Table 2f on the ethnic differences (Chinese, Malays, and In-4) It is said that Japanese American Nisei soldiers did not have as much emotional conflict with their Japanese parents in Hawaii. For more details, see Dowds (1986) , Kashima (2003) , Fugita and dians) in Singapore. General patterns seem stable over time, although there may be some changes in the response distributions for the items. Among others, an increase in the positive response to Q38 among the Indians (generalized interpersonal trust) may be remarkable: 28% in both 2004 and 2007 and 45% in 2012 . This increase might be related to some changes in Indian immigrants' status in Singapore caused by India's rapid development in the international economics and politics in the last decade. We might need to be careful, however, about the possibility of statistical fluctuation because of the smaller sample size that accompanies an analysis involving breaking down the sample by ethnicity. This is also the case with the ethnic differences in Singapore shown in Table 4d .
Basic Social Values on Human Bonds
People's sense of trust does not stand alone. To overcome the limitations of studies mostly based on the response distributions of the items of the GSS or WVS, it may be important to explore more basic social values that may underlie people's sense of trust. Although it is not easy to identify basic social values in various countries, here I tentatively show some data from the APVS on Confucianism, various important areas of daily life, and choices of Asian versus Western values.
First, Tables 4a, 4b , 4c, and 4d show the response distributions with regard to Confucianism from the APVS and the related surveys. The question asked is as follows. Q9. How do you feel about each of the following traditional values? The response categories are "strongly agree," "agree to some extent," "disagree to some extent," and "disagree strongly." a. We should respect our ancestors. b. The eldest son should look after his aging parents. c. A wife should obey (follow) her husband. d. One should not marry someone his/her parents object to. e. We should obey (follow) older people. f. It is important to have a son to keep the family line going. g. Men should work outside the home and women should tend to housekeeping.
The patterns of response distributions have been consistent for the countries or areas surveyed in the EAVS (Yoshino, 2005b) , the PRVS (Yoshino, 2009) , and the APVS, although the percentages may show some changes over time. It may be noted that, for some items, the percentages of positive choices of the USA are larger than those of the Asian countries. It cannot be the case that Americans are more influenced by Confucianism than Asians. Overall, the Asian countries seem to have already departed from the literal teachings of Confucianism (see footnote 5).
Fernandez (2004), and Miyamoto (1984 Miyamoto ( , 1986 . 5) A mistranslation was introduced by the survey agent in the USA.: "obey" should have been used in "c "and "e" where "follow" was used. However, this mistake itself may show a lack of understanding concerning Confucian teachings in the USA. The mistranslation was left in the USA 2006 survey and The figures show percentages of sum of positive categories "1. strongly agree" & "2. agree to some extent". More detailed analyses, however, show that there are national differences between, e.g., China, Korea, and Japan, as well as gender and age differences (Zheng, 2005) . Confucianism originated in China around the fifth or sixth century B. C., but it has had a greater influence in Korea than in China since the end of 14 th century A. D. However, it had an influence limited to the dominant class in Japan only during the Edo era ("samurai era" of the 17 th to the 19 th centuries). These historical differences may have led to national differences in the response distributions for those items. It is important to note that, under the present conditions, people cannot follow Confucian teachings literally. For example, the decreasing number of children in almost all countries in East Asia is a serious problem for the maintenance of national productivity or social systems concerning health care and financial support for older people. Thus, it is becoming difficult for elderly parents to be completely taken care of by their children, not to mention by the eldest son alone. Table 4d also shows a comparison of native Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders in Taiwan. Almost the same patterns are seen with respect to Confucianism, except on Q9e (obedience to seniority): more positive responses are seen among the native Taiwanese than the Chinese mainlanders. However, we must be careful regarding the distinction of the categories of native Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders. Although the categories are important in analyses, they occasionally relate to sensitive political matters. The distinction between the two groups is based on self-reporting, and the sample of valid returned questionnaires in our survey was biased, resulting in fewer mainlanders than would be expected by census data. There are at least two possibilities: our sample might have been truly biased, or the mainlanders might have hidden their identities for political reasons. Therefore, the aforementioned analysis should be considered tentative.
In addition, it may be worthwhile to note that the unexpected combination of Confucian teachings and advanced medical technology caused an ethics crisis in South Korea and Taiwan several years ago. As seen in the "b" and "f" sentences of Q9, there is a strong social pressure on women to bear sons under Confucian teaching. Wives had a hard time when they did not bear a son, and in some cases, they adopted a boy from their relatives. However, modern medicine has made it possible to bear a child by a surrogate mother. In several cases, however, rich Korean parents did not honor their responsibility to take care of the babies when they found that surrogate mothers (occasionally poor Chinese women) were to give birth to female babies. Another problem may be an unbalanced ratio of males and females in South Korea. This may be another piece of evidence against the "utility" of modern medicine without new ethics that are suitable for modern science. (Incidentally, the adoption of children is different among Japan, China, and Korea: the Japanese may adopt a child even if there is no blood relationship between the child and the parents, whereas the Chinese and Koreans adopt a child from among their relatives whenever possible.) Tables 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d show for each item and each country or area the sum of the percentages of positive categories 5, 6, and 7 on the response distributions of the importance of various areas in daily life. In all the countries we have surveyed, the degree of importance of "immediate family" was the highest among various aspects of daily life. The degree of importance of "relatives" was the second highest, but it may show variations compared to those of "immediate family": the percentages of positive categories for relatives were closer to those of "immediate family" for Asian people as well as Japanese immigrants than for Western people (except Italians). These findings may be closely linked to national character. India, Singapore and Vietnam show high degree of confidence in religious organizations in the countries of the APVS (Table  3a) , but all the three countries show a higher degree of importance for "family" and "relatives" than for "religions." Thus, we confirm that all people think that family and relatives are important among the aspects of daily life, disregarding differences between East and West, cultures, or religions.
As for the third highest choice, the percentages selecting "career," "friends," and "free time" varied among countries. This seems to be related more to economic conditions than to national character, so the percentages may vary more over time.
The Seven-Country Survey, the EAVS, the PRVS, and the APVS included the fol-lowing item, which asks respondents to choose two response categories from the four presented: two Asian principles (originally from Confucianism) and two Western principles (originally from "United States Declaration of Independence" or "Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen"). In all countries or areas in Asia, the first choice was the pair "a. Filial piety/love and respect for parents" and "b. Repaying people who have helped you in the past." In contrast, even in Western countries, the choice of the pair "c. the rights of individuals" and "d. the right of freedom" was not a majority choice. Only in France and West Germany (in 1987 before the reunification) was the rate of selection of that pair higher than those of the other pairs, but at most, it was 30% or so.
For almost all countries, "a. Filial piety/love and respect for parents" was the single first choice, i.e., the rate of the selection for each of the possible four choices tallied individually, even though Q34 asked the respondents to choose two items, not just one (see footnote 7); this is consistent with the previous observation from data in Table 5a -d. That is, the degrees of importance of immediate family and relatives were the highest and the second highest, respectively, in all countries or areas. Although the Japanese generally tend to show a preference for middle answer categories, they also choose the highest degree where the importance of family is concerned.
It may be interesting to note Todd's (1983) theory on family structures and politi- cal regimes, which suggests that the political regime is a reflection of family structure in each country. Throughout human history, "family and relatives" has formed the basis for survival, whereas human rights, such as the rights of individuals or the right to freedom, appeared only recently, although no one would deny the importance of human rights. Family and relatives are probably universally valued in both the East and the West, whereas the rights of individuals and the right to freedom originated in the "modern West," so they may be viewed differently in the current political system of each country. This may mean that each country has its own way of developing democracy as well as economic prosperity; therefore, no country should impose its particular version on other countries but respect the others' ways.
Conclusions
In this study, I have presented people's sense of trust from our survey data under our research paradigm, called cultural manifold analysis (CULMAN) (Yoshino et al., 2015) . As a whole, this study has shown some differences among countries, races, and generations regarding senses of interpersonal and institutional trust, as well as some universal social values such as the importance of family across all the peoples. Furthermore, I have repeatedly emphasized that we need to be cautious in interpreting the results because survey data on "trust" are often a compound of many variables, including economic and political factors as well as people's general response tendencies. In addition, we must consider the utility and limitation of items that are used for measuring trust. Scales may be used to measure some important dimensions related to trust, but there may be other important dimensions of trust. That is, "sense of trust" can be considered in various contexts, such as intra-personal or interpersonal relationships, inter-social groups, transactions, or moral philosophy. With these comments in mind, I believe that our survey data have clarified certain aspects of the differences among several countries or social groups in terms of trust. I will provide several comments for our future research as follows. Some may already have been mentioned, but it may be worthwhile to repeat them here. First, to facilitate a mutual understanding between East and West, we need to pay much attention to measurements of social values (Yoshino & Osaki, 2013) . Studies on the scale of trust (Yoshino, 2005b (Yoshino, , 2006 ) may caution us on the applicability of a certain "single" scale invented in Western cultures for Eastern cultures, or vice versa. Gallup (1977, p. 461) reported that, in their global survey, they could not find very poor but still happy people. Later studies, however, have found examples not consistent with the pattern of Gallup report. For example, Brazilians were very optimistic even when Brazil was the worst debtor nation in the 1980s (Inkeles, 1997) . Inglehart reported a correlation of .57 between economic development and life satisfaction for some 20 countries surveyed in the 1980s (Inkeles, 1997, pp. 366-371) . However, life satisfaction in Japan in the 1980s was lower than it was around 2000, although Japan was prosperous in the 1980s but struggled with a recession around 2000. Thus, we need to be careful regarding peoples' general response tendencies in the measurement of social values.
Second, it is important to note that people's negative responses may not necessarily mean that they lack a sense of trust. As Dogan (2000, p. 258 ) mentioned, some people may express distrust or complaint toward the government or political leaders not because they lack intra-personal or interpersonal trust but because they know that it is a way to improve their own country and eventually our world in a democratic way.
Third, a comment is needed regarding the development of the CULMAN framework. The last century was the time of the expansion of Western civilization, and this century is said to be the time of Asian revival. In this time of globalization, I think that world leaders should be knowledgeable about world geography and history and sensitive to the conditions of all countries and nations if they wish to take seriously their responsibility to develop and maintain world peace. Differences between cultures or civilizations occasionally prevent us from deeply understanding each other. In studying world history as well as the regional histories of different cultures and civ- Some pairs of these communities may overlap with each other, and the total set may comprise a sort of hierarchy as a global manifold. Each chart may be enlarged, be shrunk, or disappear over time. Two overlapping charts may be assimilated to make a larger chart. In addition, a new chart may appear. To have steady, peaceful, and prosperous development, we may need a set of "soft" regulations to connect pairs of communities rather than a single, restrictive global standard.
ilizations, however, we should remember that there are various methods of successful social development. Some institutional systems or customs are changing, converging toward more universal ones under the influence of transnational exchange or trade. Other systems are, however, becoming more sensitive to cultural differences as a reaction to globalization. The last quarter-century has shown that, at least for the foreseeable future, globalization will not lead us to a single unified global culture or a "superculture" on the earth (cf. Yoshino, 1992 ; see footnote 8). I think it is possible to use CULMAN to develop a framework of policymaking to bring about the gradual development of, so to speak, a global cultural manifold (GCM) Yoshino, 2008; Yoshino, Nikaido & Fujita, 2009, p. 107; see Fig.4 ).
The GCM is a set of hierarchical overlapping local charts, and each chart covers a certain area (region, country, national groups, civilization, etc.) . In each chart, we may assume that people share a certain culture or social values; a larger chart cor-8) For a detailed review of the literature on "globalization" and cultures, see Guillen, 2001, pp. 252-254. responds to a less restrictive but more universal culture or social values. Together, the charts may comprise a sort of hierarchy. Thus, according to the size of the chart (area, region, or social group), people may be able to consider the degree of rigidity in decision-making or the extent of regulations concerning various types of exchanges (e.g., contracts in transnational business or international trade within the members of the region). GCM charts must be dynamic, so each chart may be enlarged, be shrunk, or disappear over time. Two overlapping charts may be assimilated to make a larger chart. In addition, a new chart may appear. The EU may exemplify the concept of GCM. Currently, East Asia and the Asia-Pacific area are presenting other examples, although many people once doubted such unification because of their complicated diversity of races, languages, religions, and political systems. Weber (1904-05) argued in his theory on religion and capitalism that Asian countries would not be able to develop capitalism. Now we know of many counter-examples (such as Japan, South Korea, NIES, and China) that go against his argument. Some have argued that the Japanese adaptation of Confucianism functioned as a substitute for the Protestant ethic and led Japan to successfully develop capitalism (Morishima, 1984) . However, recent decades have seen many examples indicating that economic success is not necessarily linked to a particular ethic, ideology, or religion. Now we have more data to consider the relationships among economic development, social systems, and social values. In this time of globalization, I would like to emphasize again the fact that there are various ways to achieve successful social development, so we should not impose our own social values on any other country if we intend to develop a peaceful world.
The Japanese mind is the world of an ambiguous self, multiple realities, and multivalued attitudes (Hayashi & Kuroda, 1997) . Occasionally, Japan is considered a homogeneous society with respect to individual opinions, but this is not the case in reality. Simply because the Japanese tend to refrain from making definitive commitments to avoid possible conflicts, they often appear to be ambiguous and homogeneous. A positive side of ambiguity may lead us to generosity in accepting different social values, whereas a negative side may lead us to confusion or irresponsibility.
A new style of society demands a new type of social system. Bringing this about would first necessitate the destruction of a traditional system. A leader in Japan would have to think about the balance between the conservation of fundamental human relational systems and the quick destruction of obsolete social systems in the transitional age, as would leaders all over the world. The last two decades, however, have seen that such destruction has gone too far even in areas that we need to conserve, such as in the realm of maintaining trustful human relationships, under the misguided globalization.
On March 11, 2011, the Great East Japan earthquake caused a huge tsunami and resulted in the Fukushima nuclear power plant disaster. These brought seemingly insurmountable difficulties that Japan is still struggling to recover from. The world media, however, reported the calm attitudes of the Japanese even in the tragedy: the devastated yet surviving Japanese kept order in front of grocery stores to buy food, which may look remarkable to people of other countries where even a natural disaster can frequently lead to a riot. On the other hand, many Japanese have had a chance to reconsider the value of their own lives and work and to think of various ways of contributing to the people and area damaged by the quake. Many news stories and surveys have repeatedly reported on the human bond and the importance of family, relatives, and friends, not only on a domestic but also a worldwide scale. We have confirmed that the differences in ideology or religions are minor compared to the universal importance of family, relatives, and friends, i.e., human bonds and trust between peoples.
It is my sincere hope that mutual understanding among the various cultures and civilizations will prevent serious conflicts between nations and cultures and will lead us to a peaceful and prosperous world in the 21 st century.
